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WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW 
Volume 41 2019 Issue 1 
FOREWORD 
Sudha Setty* 
As dean of Western New England University School of Law, I thank 
the editors and staff of Volume 41 of the Western New England Law 
Review for inviting me to contribute the foreword to this issue, which 
offers an engaging, insightful, and thought-provoking set of articles and 
notes that encourage law reform in different contexts.  When considering 
legal academic scholarship, the hope is that each article we read and 
consider is a piece of the larger mosaic of knowledge and argument that 
informs the nature, shortcomings, and potential of the law.  Of course, law 
reviews have been valued over many decades for their key function of 
providing reference material for practitioners, judges, and policy makers,1 
and, at times, for pushing those same individuals to consider reforming 
the law to make it better, fairer, and more efficacious.2  As Sherrilyn Ifill, 
now president of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, opined, “‘law review 
articles offer muscular critiques on [sic] contemporary legal doctrine, 
alternative approaches to solving complex legal questions, and reflect a 
deep concern with the practical effect of legal decisionmaking on how law 
develops in the courtroom.’”3  The set of articles in Issue 1 reflects the 
best of what Ifill describes. 
 
* Dean and Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. 
1. See Christian C. Day, The Case for Professionally-Edited Law Reviews, 33 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 563, 563–64 (2007). 
2. Consider the stated ambition of the founding editors of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review: “[T]o be a review of revolutionary law.”  Editors, Preface, 1 HARV. CIV. 
RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV., at iii (1966). 
3. See Law Prof. Ifill Challenges Chief Justice Roberts’ Take on Academic Scholarship, 
AM. CONST. SOC’Y: ACSBLOG (Jul. 5, 2011), available at https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-
prof-ifill-challenges-chief-justice-roberts-take-on-academic-scholarship/ 
[https://perma.cc/FSW9-LB8E] (quoting Danielle Citron, Sherrilyn Ifill on What the Chief 
Justice Should Read on Summer Vacation, CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 1, 2011), 
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/07/sherrilyn-ifill-on-what-the-chief-justice-
should-read-on-summer-vacation.html [https://perma.cc/Z6H8-2QQM]). 
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This foreword also provides an opportunity for me to reflect briefly 
on legal education more generally, and the role of law reviews in 
particular.  This is particularly apt in 2019, the centennial year of Western 
New England University, which included legal education at its inception 
in September 1919.4  One hundred years ago, our law teaching was not 
focused on the “muscular critiques” we value in law reviews today, or on 
law reviews at all.  Instead, the institutional mission reflected the needs of 
the greater Springfield community, providing an opportunity for legal 
education that was available to the working public, with night classes 
offered at the YMCA building in downtown Springfield.5  In 1919, one 
full-time professor was hired to run what was then the Springfield division 
of Northeastern College, and he worked with a cohort of part-time 
teachers to start teaching law.6  As the bulletin in the Springfield Daily 
News said in August 1919, “there will be offered during the evening 
hours, at reasonable rates, course of study on the highest plane and leading 
to marked efficiency.”7  It was, apparently, a good sales pitch, since 
twenty-three students enrolled that fall to study law.8 
We have come a long way as a university, just as legal education has 
changed markedly over the course of a century.  Yet some things remain 
the same.  We still offer a course of study that engages students on the 
highest plane while also developing their practical skills through a deep 
institutional commitment to experiential learning.  Our faculty prioritizes 
working with our students as they grow into thoughtful, ethical, and 
engaged lawyers.  This emphasis comes naturally to Western New 
England, which has, for its one hundred years, been student-centered and 
focused on providing educational experiences that build skills and prepare 
students for real-world lawyering.  The Law Review is a part of that 
endeavor, as it has been for the forty-one years of its existence.  The 1992 
American Bar Association (ABA) MacCrate Report9 and the 2007 
 
4. University History, W. NEW ENG. UNIV., https://www1.wne.edu/about/history.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/XAA8-DWQA]. 
5. ROSEMARY K. O’DONOGHUE, WESTERN NEW ENGLAND: FROM COLLEGE TO 
UNIVERSITY viii (2012), https://www1.wne.edu/university-archives/doc/WNE_History.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3RXB-LZFZ]. 
6. Id. 
7. BEAUMONT A. HERMAN, W. NEW ENGLAND COLLEGE: A CALLING TO FULFILL 4 
(1980). 
8. See id. at 5. 
9. See generally SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE 
GAP (1992) (outlining the needs of the U.S. legal profession and recommending increases in 
skills- and values-based education in law schools). 
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Carnegie Report10 emphasized the need for skills-based learning in law 
schools.  In 2004, the ABA adopted standards which required that 
“student[s] receive substantial instruction in . . . other professional skills 
generally regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation 
in the legal profession; . . .”11  Working on law review builds these skills; 
as such, it is part of our core educational purpose,12 as practical lawyering 
and skill-building continue to lie at the heart of Western New England’s 
institutional mission. 
Yet, the Law Review serves as much more than an educational 
opportunity.  In this issue, the authors, many of them practitioners with 
decades of experience and expertise to draw upon, offer potential legal 
reforms to help legal scholars, practitioners, and the public understand 
possible shortcomings of the current state of the law and help law and 
policy makers contemplate potential improvements.  This service is 
arguably more important now than any time in the last one hundred years, 
as we are inundated with information from a seemingly endless variety of 
news sources, blog posts, tweets, opinion columns, and other online 
media.  Such sources may inform, update, and provide contemporaneous 
analysis; however, we must proceed knowing that this kind of information 
supplements deep thinking and learning but does not supplant it.  To 
mistake the two carries enormous risk.  As Malcolm Gladwell observed, 
“I have sensed . . . an enormous frustration with the unexpected costs of 
knowing too much, of being inundated with information.  We have come 
to confuse information with understanding.”13  The articles in this issue 
reflect the deep thinking and learning that characterizes the best in legal 
scholarship.  They help us increase our understanding of complex issues 
in the fields of criminal, tort, and constitutional law, and to encourage us 
to consider how the law may be developing, or how the law should be 
developed. 
The issue begins with two thoughtful pieces that draw upon their 
authors’ decades of experience as prosecutors in the federal and state 
justice systems.  In Mirroring the Trial: Making Sense of the Law of 
 
10. See generally WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION 
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) (recommending an integrated approach to legal education 
that incorporated legal theory, ethics, and practical skills). 
11. See STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCH. 2004, 
Standard 302(a)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004). 
12. See Cameron Stracher, Reading, Writing, and Citing: In Praise of Law Reviews, 52 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 349, 360 (2007–2008). 
13. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 264 
(Back Bay Books 2007) (“We live in a world saturated with information.  We have virtually 
unlimited amounts of [information] at our fingertips at all times, and we’re well versed in the 
arguments about the dangers of not knowing enough and not doing our homework.”). 
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Closing Argument in Criminal Cases,14 Alex J. Grant, an Assistant United 
States Attorney, provides a detailed consideration of the role of closing 
arguments in federal criminal trials, and the significant limitations placed 
upon prosecutors in that context.  Grant argues for reform predicated on 
the need for basic fairness in trials.  Specifically, Grant advocates for 
prosecutors to be granted more leeway during closing arguments to voice 
their opinions regarding the credibility of the defendant and various 
witnesses and to address and argue against potential jury nullification.  
Grant argues that this greater flexibility would not only place prosecutors 
and defense attorneys on a more even and—in Grant’s view—fairer 
footing but would also create more consistency in the way in which courts 
run trials. 
The need to increase fairness in the criminal justice system is framed 
in a different context in Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights: The Supreme Judicial Court’s “Cruel” and “Unusual” Neglect of 
Its Longevity Component,15 by Thomas H. Townsend, Chief of the 
Appellate Division of the Northwestern District Attorney’s Office in 
Massachusetts.  Townsend considers the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights—which predates and serves as a model for the United States 
Constitution—and its prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.  
Townsend encourages the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) to 
exercise more power in discharging its duty to protect its citizens by 
interpreting Article 26 as grounds for convicted defendants to challenge 
the length of their sentences.  Townsend notes that the SJC has previously 
interpreted Article 26 in ways that are more protective of a defendant’s 
rights under the United States Constitution.  As such, Townsend advocates 
for the SJC to rely upon Article 26 to develop a better framework for 
determining fair and proportional sentences for crimes, such as statutory 
rape, in which sentencing is currently—in Townsend’s view—incredibly 
unfair and problematic.  
The next two articles in Issue 1 come from practitioners with deep 
experience in civil litigation and reflect their thoughtful approach to 
important issues faced by real lawyers on an ongoing basis.  In The 
Wrongful Demise of But For Causation,16  Tory A. Weigand, drawing on 
extensive experience and expertise in his field, advocates for reform to the 
 
14. Alex J. Grant, Mirroring the Trial: Making Sense of the Law of Closing Argument in 
Criminal Cases, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 7 (2019). 
15. Thomas H. Townsend, Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: The 
Supreme Judicial Court’s “Cruel” and “Unusual” Neglect of Its Longevity Component, 41 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (2019). 
16. Tory A. Weigand, The Wrongful Demise of But For Causation, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 75 (2019). 
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way in which tort claims are litigated, beginning with an analysis of the 
current framework for considering causation.  He looks closely at 
situations in which multiple potential causes for a tort exist and considers 
the difficulty that courts and advocates have had in applying a substantial 
factor test instead of relying on but for causation.  Weigand makes the 
case for reinstating the primacy of but for causation through a careful 
analysis of Massachusetts case law and the cautionary language in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts with regard to the use (and potential overuse) 
of the substantial factor test. 
In Opt-Out and the Fourth Era of Workers’ Compensation: Has 
Industry Left the Bargaining Table?,17 Daniel E. Walker takes a careful 
look at the history of workers’ compensation to consider the feasibility 
and constitutionality of efforts to use alternative benefit plans to manage 
compensation for injured employees.  Walker examines recent cases, such 
as one in which an ERISA-governed alternative benefit plan was struck 
down on constitutional grounds, to consider what lessons can be learned 
by those seeking to craft similar plans in the future that might retain tort 
immunity for employers while also limiting state oversight of the 
administration of such plans.  Walker’s careful analysis is contextualized 
in his larger consideration of how industry lobbying has eroded older 
models of workers’ compensation, and the likelihood that a new era of 
workers’ compensation may be upon us. 
The final two pieces in Issue 1 are student notes that take on important 
constitutional matters that resonate strongly given current political hot-
button topics and the content and tenor of societal discourse.  The subjects 
considered in these notes implicate conversations covered widely in the 
news, yet these authors do important work with their extensive, in-depth 
and thoughtful scholarly analysis, making significant contributions to the 
literature in their respective areas.  In “See Ya in Boston, Bruh”: Making 
the Link Between the Right of Petition, Activism, and the Massachusetts 
Anti-SLAPP Statute,18 Heidi K. Waugh considers the protections provided 
by the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP statute to those defending themselves 
against defamation suits by claiming status as “petitioners” to the 
government.  Waugh notes that the statutory right to seek dismissal is one 
way in which those who have legitimate, but controversial, government 
petitions can have their First Amendment rights protected without getting 
 
17. Daniel E. Walker, Opt-Out and the Fourth Era of Workers’ Compensation: Has 
Industry Left the Bargaining Table?, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 111 (2019). 
18. Heidi K. Waugh, Note, “See Ya in Boston, Bruh”: Making the Link Between the Right 
of Petition, Activism, and the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 141 
(2019). 
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bogged down in lengthy and costly litigation.  Waugh observes that 
modern political engagement and government petitioning take numerous 
forms, and that Massachusetts courts must apply the state’s anti-SLAPP 
statute consistently in order to preserve its purpose.  Waugh considers 
approaches used in other jurisdictions to suggest an assessment 
framework for Massachusetts courts that would provide more consistency 
and improve fairness. 
In I Beg Your Pardon: Ex parte Garland Overruled; the Presidential 
Pardon is No Longer Unlimited,19 Zachary J. Broughton takes a close look 
at the current hot-topic of the scope of the president’s pardon power.  
Broughton considers the broad pardon power supported by the United 
States Supreme Court in Ex parte Garland in the context of limitations of 
the pardon power articulated by the Supreme Court in more recent 
decades.  Through a careful parsing of pre-constitutional pardon powers 
and the United States Supreme Court cases that have considered the 
pardon power, Broughton argues that the expansive reading of the pardon 
power in Ex parte Garland no longer holds, and that the Supreme Court 
ought to make clear that the pardon power is limited and subject to judicial 
review. 
Justice Cardozo once famously cautioned against the “tendency of a 
principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.”20  The six authors in this 
issue take up that cause, challenging us to consider the history, logic, and 
justice of various principles in criminal, civil, and constitutional law.  In 
doing so, they ask all readers, including policy and law makers, to 
reconsider the principles undergirding these disparate areas of law with 
the benefit of their deep thinking and careful research on these subjects.  
As we mark one hundred years at Western New England University, I can 
think of nothing better to exemplify the thoughtful and engaging work that 
the School of Law seeks to inspire than these articles; they encourage us 
to follow Justice Cardozo’s guidance and to determine for ourselves 
whether the laws examined here, and how those laws are implemented, 
have reached the limits of their logic. 
 
 
19. Zachary J. Broughton, Note, I Beg Your Pardon: Ex parte Garland Overruled; the 
Presidential Pardon is No Longer Unlimited, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 183 (2019). 
20. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Lecture II: The Methods of History, Tradition and Sociology, 
in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51, 51 (Yale Univ. Press 1921). 
